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Which Of The Following Is Not A Common Method Of Privatizing Government Services

"The ideas, decisions and plans of military and noncombatant integration must be fully implemented in all fields of national economic and defence force construction and in the whole processes. The integration should value national socialist reward of pooling resources to solve major problems and raising working efficiency. The integration must combine land guidance with the market's part, and comprehensively employ institutional innovation, policy support and legal guarantee to give full play to military and noncombatant integration." — Xi-Jinping, 20 Jun 2017 1

Relations between the civilian establishment and military machine have been symbiotic over centuries in all countries. The wide consensus everywhere is that civilian control is desirable. The military needs to be strong enough to ensure the stability of the civilian authorities and stay abroad from assuming command even when it perceives that the civilian government is going wrong.

These civil-military relations have different flavours in different countries. In most democracies, information technology is driven by the noncombatant government. It is transactional and relates to cooperation in various fields including enquiry and evolution, growth of military industrial complex and assist to civil regime, when requisitioned. In authoritarian states, information technology is driven by the military with the civilian authorities heavily dependent on it to ensure the existence and stability of the government. A strong military machine is a prerequisite for the security of the nation which in turn promotes and provides socio-economic development. However, there have been a few distinct developments in the past few decades.

One, there has been a dramatic increase in overall defence budgets of countries. Information technology has reached a figure of $1981 billion in 2020, with the US leading at $778 billion and China following at $252 billion.ii This has led to development of a massive defence industrial complex in many nations. Secondly, many of the technologies in use today have originated from the armed forces due east.g. Internet, rockets and Global Positioning System (GPS). At that place are slap-up benefits too for armed services modernisation. It can relieve funds invested in R&D, production, lead to shorter term evolution cycles and thereby reduce risk to civilian industries as well. This can accept identify at three levels – facility, business firm and sector. Personnel equipment and materials could be shared by facilities or even manufacture war machine and civilian goods next. At the Firm-level, integration involves separate product lines and the joint military-civilian utilize of corporate resource such every bit direction, labour, and equipment. Finally, integrated industrial sectors such as aerospace or shipbuilding tin can draw from a common pool of inquiry and development activities, technologies and production processes.3

Thirdly, in nations such every bit Russian federation, Mainland china and Bharat, the defence force R&D and production has been dominated by Country-Endemic Enterprises (SOEs). Heavily funded and supported by the state, these monoliths are wearisome to react to rapid changes in technology and have poor efficiency.

Armed services-Civil Fusion (junminronghe) or MCF, has evolved from Civil-Armed forces Integration (junminjiehe) and is a circuitous gear up of initiatives past the People's Democracy of China (PRC) to share resource between the military and civilian manufacture. Equally in many other cases, it has been largely inspired by the United states military-industrial complex which dominates the global arms industry and helps projection the U.s. every bit a pre-eminent global superpower. A core focus of the MCF is the effort to leverage technological expertise from the noncombatant sector in order to benefit the development of advanced weapons systems and other equipment for the People's Liberation Regular army (PLA). Even so, MCF is much more than that: information technology also embraces a broad fix of organisational changes and information-sharing mechanisms intended to break downwardly barriers between People's republic of china's military machine and commercial sectors – with the ultimate aim of sharing resources and expertise from both sides, while keeping these efforts firmly nether state direction. Whether this aggressive programme succeeds or fails, will have significant implications for the course of Chinese military machine modernisation equally well as for the hereafter direction of China's high-technology and other emerging industrial sectors.4

This paper aims to bear out an analysis of MCF in the post-obit parts:–

    • Strategy and Policies
    • Implementation
    • Chinese quest for advanced technologies

MCF Strategy

"Greater efforts have to be invested in military modernisation to see national security demands. The PLA nevertheless lags far behind the earth's leading militaries." —Mainland china's 2019 Defence force White Paper5

Equally is well known, the Chinese land and military are closely intertwined and in fact, the PLA is an Army of the party and not of the nation. The People's Commonwealth of Mainland china was born out of a revolution in which the PLA has had a major role. Since its inception, every Chinese leader has pursued some form of synergy between the ii. No discussion on MCF tin can happen without co-relating it to evolution of PLA's military strategy which has moved from 'People's War' to 'Intelligentised Warfare'. 6 This has led to the PLA laying greater accent on engineering science equally a battle-winning factor and requiring greater cooperation with manufacture and R&D institutions.

In the initial years, the focus was on development of the industrial base of operations. They were weighing in on balancing the need between security and evolution. The military function postal service the Korean War was envisaged to be assisting development of the nation through dual apply production lines. Civilian products coming out of defence industry manufacturing bases constituted up to 3/ivth of their total production.7 With Deng Xiaoping at the captain and the focus on development through 'four modernisations', military machine development took a back seat. He also believed that Soviet-inspired defence industrial base was wasteful and restricted evolution.8

3 major factors in subsequent years necessitated change in this policy. The Tiananmen massacre in 1989 resulted in sanctions existence imposed on Prc and thus necessitated a movement towards self-reliance. Secondly, this almost coincided with the breakdown of the USSR, which was a major arms supplier to Mainland china thereby causing a disruption in modernisation of the PLA. A related aspect was that with the breakup of the USSR, the earth order was in turmoil and moving towards being uni-polar which was not what Prc would accept liked and information technology has since then attempted to occupy that space. Thirdly, the Gulf War demonstrated the disruptive bear on of a technologically superior military machine to PLA analysts.

Jiang Zemin was instrumental in adjustment technological developments with armed services strategy and laid out his policy of 'winning local wars under informatised conditions'. This was too the first fourth dimension that the scope of the MCF was expanded across manufacture to include infrastructure, logistics, educational activity and exploring dual apply technologies. Hu Jintao era too led to a modify in terminology from 'integration' to 'fusion-manner'. This era also coincided with great strides in economic and technological developments in the PRC and influenced the MCF by way of more integration and greater telescopic.

While Xi Jinping beginning spoke of MCF in March 2014, at the 2nd session of the 12thursday National People Congress (NPC), most consider his remarks in the 3rd session of the NPC in March 2015, equally the watershed for evolution of MCF into a National Strategy.nine A major attribute covered towards implementation of the MCF was the financial resources earmarked for information technology. The full of these funds is estimated to exist over $68.5 billion in anticipated investment over many years.ten While the sum may announced big, similar all government figures, these cannot be taken at face up value as these might be inflated or include expenditure on aspects not directly related to the MCF. The additional upshot of leakages, mismanagement and possibility of these beingness appropriated by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the exact opposite of what they were to practice, exists.

The Chinese forcefulness (and weakness too) has been the land-controlled acme-down planning and implementation of various strategies. They studied the US model and modified it to accommodate their ain environment. The importance given to MCF can be gauged from the involvement of Xi Jinping himself in a number of bodies created to implement information technology. At the first plenary meeting of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development held on June 20, 2017, Eleven Jinping identified areas for MCF. These included infrastructure, national defence force-related sci-tech industry, weapon and equipment procurement, talent cultivation, socialisation of the support system for the military, as well equally the mobilisation for national defence force.11

Infrastructure

Cathay, like many other nations, believes in creating dual utilise infrastructure which could be for both civilian and war machine apply as and when the demand arises. These include highways which could exist used for landing armed forces shipping, common space infrastructure so on. This also diffuses the funding and the assets created are improve utilised. MCF efforts in infrastructure encompass the following broad areas:–

    • Transportation Infrastructure
    • Airways
    • Railways
    • Highways
    • Bounding main lanes and Waterways
    • Space Infrastructure
    • Data Infrastructure
    • Telegraphic Infrastructure
    • Weather Infrastructure
    • Standardisation Infrastructure

Military Personnel Talent Cultivation

With increasing modernisation, the PLA realises the importance of increasing the threshold of technical education to military personnel. These efforts are aimed at officers and NCOs equally and carried out through two means:

Military Institutions: This includes 34 officers Institutions which have been optimised in June 2017 from 63 and three NCOs Institutions reduced from four earlier.12 The scope includes basic military machine training and professional armed services education throughout the service including advanced science and technology subjects besides warfare.

Civil Universities: As the Chinese war machine modernises and yet continues with the conscription system, it grapples with military personnel handling increasingly sophisticated equipment with shorter training cycles. This is beingness overcome by having more university graduates joining PLA. In The past ii decades or and then, there has too been an enhanced accent on attracting better talent graduating from universities. This again has been for both officers and NCOs and considering the brusque conscription period, is vital for quick absorption of understanding of war machine equipment past personnel. The added benefit being that this large pool of trained and educated PLA personnel in one case de-mobilised, will enhance the understanding of military requirements and foster better relations with the PLA.

The other aspect is that these universities undertake enquiry in armed forces related technologies or dual-use technologies. This provides scope for diffused funding nether non-military heads and retains the advantage of access to cutting edge research. Prc has designated 12 of the country's top universities to build "schools of future technology" in however another motility past the country to become a global science and technology powerhouse. The prestigious Peking University and Tsinghua University in Beijing are among the first batch of college education institutions designated by the Ministry building of Teaching to establish new schools focused on edifice China'south advantage in frontier technologies.13

Military machine – Civil Science and Technology Coordination and Innovation

The Chinese military technology acquisition has been primarily through false of foreign military equipment either through procuring and then copying the platforms or through acquisition of designs and processes through illegal means. The term 'zizhuchuangxin' therefore has metamorphosed from 'indigenous innovation' to 'self-initiated innovation' and could include both original innovations or employ the Introduce, Digest, Assist and Re-innovation (IDAR) approach to maximise the capabilities. At that place has also been a parallel movement to heighten the Intellectual Belongings Rights (IPRs) to legitimise and encourage innovations.

The Innovation process has suffered from the monopoly of SOEs which are loathe to any changes and have a weak R&D base of operations. Red china has, therefore, lagged backside in 'Original' innovation as compared to the other countries, though it has been improving its ranking. Innovations are too by and large coming from get-go-ups, every bit is the trend worldwide. These are staffed by smarter, bolder and younger people and are nimbler and cheaper. Harnessing their niche expertise into the military, however, is challenging due to the military bureaucracy and dominance of SOEs.

The investment in offset-ups has not been restricted to China itself, but the Chinese have been heavily investing in showtime-ups in the Usa, Israel and as well India. The year 2019, for example, saw 94 percent increase in Chinese greenbacks flow into Indian beginning-ups to $3,916 million from $2020 one thousand thousand in 2018, which itself is a seven-fold jump from $459 million in 2016.14 Equally per reports, eighteen out of 30 Unicorns of India are heavily backed by Chinese investment, though this effigy is irresolute due to restrictions put in by the Indian regime over past few years.fifteen These investments are for multiple reasons. Availability of funds with Chinese venture capital funds and the lack of it with Indian beginning-ups, the technical expertise offered, inroads into Indian industry and terminal simply non the least, access to large Indian datasets.

In March 2017, the PLA for the first time in its history, declassified more 3,000 dual-utilize engineering patents and released ii,346 to the public in an effort to increase transparency, incentivise innovation and facilitate defence conversion. The patents included a synthetic aperture imaging system, a high-power pulse modulator for a medical linear accelerator, a lateral drift control method for unmanned helicopters and a blast energy arresting honeycomb structure, to name a few. In addition, the military opened more of its current projects to civilian contractors. However, the contradiction between the state-owned and non-public sectors remains, as the former yet mistrusts the latter and the latter wishes for more leverage in dealing with the former.xvi

Nevertheless, despite the large state funding and support, Cathay has not been at the forefront of innovations and this has been attributed past some to the function of the Chinese Communist Political party in every aspect of MCF from industry to R&D and to academia which binds them and gives them picayune say in governance of these institutions. The freedom to pursue ideas wherever they may lead is a precondition for innovation but this is continually curtailed by greater office of political party in their operation.17

Logistics Back up

This consists of two aspects. First is leveraging the socio-economical development to support logistic functions for the armed services. A trend which has been widely followed past various nations in quality of life, engineering support, infrastructure, housing, transportation, health services and provision of food for military personnel. This allows the military to focus on its cadre functions i.e. waging gainsay and reduce the 'Teeth to Tail' ratio. The second aspect is supporting and sustaining military operations in the field. The impetus for this was given as part of major PLA reforms carried out in 2016 past way of cosmos of CMC Logistic Support Department and a CMC Articulation Logistics Support Force.18

Mobilisation

China relied on 'People's War' as a war fighting strategy in its initial years and has continued to lay importance on its citizens to provide support to state of war fighting efforts as well as armed services to support during national disasters. Towards this terminate, the CMC National Defence Mobilisation was created as role of the PLA reforms in 2016. This was too to overcome the shortcomings observed in war machine-civil cooperation earlier. With the upgraded department being placed directly nether CMC, it was planned to accept better oversight over the provincial armed forces districts and reserve forces.

In addition, there is an boosted body under the State Council, i.eastward. the National Defence Mobilisation Committee which is an umbrella torso for tasks like conscription, defense force transport and civil air defence. While this looks good on paper, there have been difficulties in implementation particularly with respect to civilian firms providing manpower and national support during mobilisation also as re-imbursement of cost incurred. Towards this end, the 1997 National Defence Police force was revised in 2010.

The Chinese Defence Manufacture

While seven Chinese defense companies figure in the global top 20, a noteworthy statistic is that the revenues from defence portfolio for Chinese companies are lesser than the others hence showing a strong bias to civilian portfolio. The vast majority of the equipment and technologies purchased past the PLA are supplied past nine State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and one country-endemic research institute.19 These organisations tend to be conglomerates that own multiple – often dozens – of subsidiaries. These small numbers of massive firms boss each of the five major defense industry sectors: aerospace, electronics, land systems, nuclear, and shipbuilding.

The SOEs have a top-down approach and receive heavy direction from military and civilian leaders and are not as responsive to changes in applied science as Western firms.

Sector Company Proper noun Key Military Appurtenances
Aerospace •  Aero Engine Corporation of People's republic of china (AECC)

•  Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)

•  Communist china Aerospace Scientific discipline and Technology Corporation (CASC)

Aircraft engines

Aircraft and avionics

Missiles and space system

Electronics •  China Electronics Applied science Group Corporation (CETC) Armed forces Sonar, Radar, Electronic Warfare systems, C4ISR systems (land, ocean and air), information infrastructure
Land Organisation •  People's republic of china Due north Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO)

•  Prc South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC)

Armoured Vehicles, artillery, guided weapons, armament, air defence organisation, small arms

Armoured vehicles, small-scale artillery

Nuclear •  China University of Engineering Physics (CAEP)

•  Mainland china National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear ability, Nuclear fuel

Shipbuilding •  People's republic of china Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC)

•  China Land Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)

Surface ships , submarines, naval weapons, naval electronics

Surface ships and technical support

Chinese Attempts to Stay Ahead in the Artillery Technology Race

The Chinese have been oft accused of and even punished for trying to shut the military applied science gap with the Western nations through both legal and illegal means.20 This is being done through multiple ways and either past increased funding into Research and Development or committing outright intellectual-property theft and has been a cause of concern for not just the US, but recently these concerns have been aired by Russia. The erstwhile Usa Defense force Secretarial assistant Marker Esper said at a conference, "The Mainland china is perpetrating the greatest intellectual holding theft in human history. Every Chinese visitor has the potential to exist an accomplice in Beijing's state-sponsored campaign to steal engineering science. Nations that partner with Chinese firms, put the security of their networks at risk." 21 Yevgeny Livadny, Rostec'southward Chief of Intellectual Belongings Projects, has said that "Unauthorised copying of our equipment abroad is a huge problem. There have been 500 such cases over the past 17 years. China solitary has copied shipping engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defence missiles and analogues of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems." 22

Chinese companies, in many cases with the backing of the Chinese authorities, utilise a variety of methods to acquire valuable engineering, Intellectual Holding (IP), and know-how from Western firms.23

    • Strange Directly Investment (FDI)
    • Venture Capital (VC) Investments
    • Joint Ventures (JVs)
    • Licensing Agreements
    • Cyber Espionage
    • Talent Acquisitions

The examples and reasons are not difficult to believe. While China is already the world'southward second largest arms producer, the ability of its arms industry to domestically develop certain advanced weapon systems is questionable. As can be seen in the graphic, aircraft and engines remain a cause of concern.

As can exist seen from the accompanying pictures, the Chinese versions of their 'country-of-the art' aircraft closely resemble those made elsewhere. Just the most ardent would believe that the Chinese had the same brainwave as others to develop these aircraft. The bigger cause of concern to the defense force industry in the West and Russia has been that the Chinese are able to re-create, produce and supply these to nations, especially the developing ones, at a much lower price.

The inability to follow through on sophisticated systems like engines also leads us to believe that while it's easier to obtain these designs through cyber espionage or past erstwhile employees obtaining and passing on the same to the Chinese and thereafter reverse applied science to manufacture the shipping, the other technologies like precise metallurgy and design needs to keep pace. Rise states benefit from the "reward of backwardness". By free riding on the inquiry and technology of the nearly advanced countries, less developed states can close the military-​technological gap with their rivals relatively hands and quickly and this is facilitated past globalisation, the emergence of dual-​utilize components and advances in communications including the opportunity for cyber espionage. This, however, largely ignores ane of the well-nigh important changes to take occurred in the realm of weapons development i.due east. the exponential increase in the complication of military engineering.

The increase in complexity has significantly raised the entry barriers for the production of advanced weapon systems. Countries must at present possess an extremely advanced industrial, scientific, and technological base in weapons production before they can copy foreign military engineering science. As a result, the advantage of backwardness has shrunk significantly and know-​how and feel in the production of avant-garde weapon systems accept become an important source of power for those who master these.24 It is for this reason that nations endeavour to continually explore newer and unique technologies to gain a decisive edge against their adversaries. This attribute is covered in the Chinese context in another section of this paper.

The attribute of cyber espionage is another huge business organisation equally it not simply leads to theft of Intellectual belongings, simply too exposes the weak cyber security which could lead to loss of information and worse, other highly classified military information. As U.s. FBI Director Christopher Wray has noted, "The greatest long-term threat to our nation'due south information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from Cathay."25

There has been a fight back, particularly by the US to contain and reverse Chinese attempts to gain access to military engineering. This is as well part of the broader power struggle betwixt the two nations. The Usa has in the contempo past, imposed severe sanctions on Chinese companies having links with its military with President Trump issuing an executive order in November 2020, disallowment U.s. investment in 31 companies that the Department of Defense force designated as "Communist Chinese military machine companies." The list included almost of Chinese defence force SOEs besides a few leading private players like Hikvision and Huawei.26 The US Department of Commerce has been considering designating farther 89 Chinese companies as "military end users," and imposing restrictions on them likewise.27

Disruptive Technologies

The key to stay ahead in the artillery race is to develop technologies not possessed by other nations. These could provide a dramatic edge in both peace and war. Some of the technologies being pursued by China are Artificial Intelligence, Breakthrough, Hypersonic and Directed Free energy Weapons, unmanned systems and bio-medicine and engineering. In each of these, the Chinese R&D, academia and private companies are playing a vital role. During the xixth Party Congress held in October 2017, 11 Jinping highlighted the country's ambition to transform itself into a "science and technology superpower".28 He has also called for breakthroughs in AI and highlighted rapid, revolutionary advances taking identify in AI and breakthrough science.29

The Stumbling Blocks

As is ordinarily the instance, personal ambitions may be the biggest impediment to further MCF. Xi Jinping wants to harness the innovative potential of domestic loftier-tech, merely his assaults on individual technology companies could bear witness the constabulary of unintended consequences. In contempo months, the CCP has cracked downwards hard on Mainland china's private-sector tech companies. Last October, Jack Ma criticised the CCP for stifling innovation. In response, the communist regime fined his Alibaba due east-commerce firm $two.viii billion for violating arbitrary anti-trust laws, while an Alibaba subsidiary, Pismire Grouping, had its IPO squashed. Other private loftier-tech companies, including Tencent, Didi, and Pinduoduo, have similarly had their wings clipped.30 In a stark reversal of previous policies towards encouraging private sector, the bulletin is clear – serve the Political party with the aim of having "a thriving tech scene producing world-beating innovations under the pollex of the Communist Political party."31

DISCLAIMER: The Views expressed and suggestions made in the article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement. Attributability of the contents lies purely with the author.

Endnotes

  1. Xi urges efforts to heave integrated military and civilian development, Xinhua, 21 June 2017

  2. SIPRI Yearbook 2021, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/sipri_yb21_summary_en_v2_0.pdf

  3. Civil-Military Integration and Chinese Armed services Modernization, Asia-Pacific Heart for Security Studies Volume 3 – Number 9, December 2004, https://apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/Civil-MilitaryIntegration.pdf#:~:text=Civil-military%20integration%20%28CMI%29%20is%20the%20process%20of%20combining,U.S.%20Congressional%20Office%20of%20Technology%20Assessment%2C%20CMI%20includes%3A

  4. China Brief Special Issue: Armed services-Civil Fusion And Its Prospects For The PLA And Chinese Manufacture, Book 19, Issue 18, 08 Oct 2019, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Read-the-10-08-2019-CB-Consequence-in-PDF2.pdf?x11483

  5. Full Text: Red china'south National Defense in the New Era, Xinhua | English.news.cn (xinhuanet.com)

  6. The Development of People's republic of china's Army and Military machine Strategy, Sergio Miracola, 27 September 2019, https://www.ispionline.information technology/en/pubblicazione/evolution-chinas-regular army-and-military-strategy-24040

  7. China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy , Alex Rock and Peter Wood, China Aerospace Studies Plant, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/x/CASI/documents/Enquiry/Other-Topics/CASI_China_Military_Civil_Fusion_Strategy.pdf?ver=Ad0daPKcZNbcEg2latiO0Q%3d%3d

  8. Ibid, p 21

  9. Prc's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy , Alex Stone and Peter Woods, Communist china Aerospace Studies Institute, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Inquiry/Other-Topics/CASI_China_Military_Civil_Fusion_Strategy.pdf?ver=Ad0daPKcZNbcEg2latiO0Q%3d%3d

  10. Myths and Realities of China's Military-Ceremonious Fusion Strategy, Elsa B. Kania and LorandLaskai, CNAS, 28 January 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy

  11. Red china names key areas of military machine-civilian integration, CGTN, Wang Lei, 21 June 2017, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d41444d7751444e/share_p.html

  12. The People'south Liberation Army's 37 Academic Institutions, China Aerospace Studies Institute, xi June 2020

  13. US-China tech war: Communist china taps 12 summit universities to rival MIT and Stanford in science and technology inquiry, Iris Deng, South China Morning Postal service, 27 May 2021, https://world wide web.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3135087/u.s.a.-prc-tech-war-china-taps-12-acme-universities-rival-mit-and-stanford

  14. From China with funding: Land puts its organized religion in Indian start-ups, T E Narasimhan, Business concern Standard, 26 December 2019, https://www.business concern-standard.com/article/companies/what-explains-chinese-investors-new-found-beloved-for-indian-startups-119122500703_1.html

  15. Chinese app ban to create funding hurdle for Indian unicorns and soonicorns, PeerzadaAbrar, Concern Standard, 02 July 2020, https://www.concern-standard.com/article/companies/chinese-app-ban-to-create-funding-hurdle-for-indian-unicorns-and-soonicorns-120070101740_1.html

  16. Privatizing Communist china's Defense force Industry, Zi Yang, The Diplomat, 07 June 2017

  17. Why China Tin't Innovate, Regina M Abrami, William C Kirby and F Warren McFarlan, Harvard Business concern Review, March 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/03/why-red china-cant-introduce

  18. Cathay Establishes Joint Logistic Back up Force – China Military, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7256651_5.htm

  19. How Developed Is Communist china's Arms Manufacture?, https://chinapower.csis.org/artillery-companies/

  20. China steals US designs for new weapons, and it'due south getting away with 'the greatest intellectual property theft in human history', Ellen Ioanes, Business organisation Insider,25 September 2019, https://www.businessinsider.in/slideshows/miscellaneous/mainland china-steals-u.s.a.-designs-for-new-weapons-and-its-getting-abroad-with-the-greatest-intellectual-property-theft-in-human-history/slidelist/71285008.cms#slideid=71285009

  21. Esper Exhorts Allies To Ban Chinese 5G: Britain's Huawei Dilemma, Sydney J FreedbergJr, Breaking Defence, nineteen September 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/esper-exhorts-allies-to-ban-chinese-5g/

  22. At present Russia Accuses China of Technology Theft, James M. Dorsey, The Globalist, 02 Jan 2020, https://www.theglobalist.com/russia-china-intellectual-holding-theft-engineering-arms-sales/

  23. How Chinese Companies Facilitate Engineering Transfer from the United States, Sean O'Connor, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission staff Research Written report, 06 May 2019, https://world wide web.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%20Companies%20Facilitate%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf

  24. Why Red china Has Not Defenseless Upward Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Faux, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage, Andrea and Mauro Gilli, International Security (2019) 43 (three): 141–189.

  25. The China Threat, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-cathay-threat

  26. Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020 Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies, Federal Register Vol 85, No 222, 17 November 2020, https://abode.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13959.pdf

  27. In latest Prc jab, U.South. drafts list of 89 firms with military ties, Karen Freifeld, Reuters, 23 November 2020, https://world wide web.reuters.com/article/usa-communist china-armed forces-companies/exclusive-in-latest-china-jab-united states-drafts-list-of-89-firms-with-military-ties-idUSKBN28307Z

  28. "Xi Jinping's Report at the Chinese Communist Party 19th National Congress", Xinhua, 27 October 2017, http://world wide web.china.com.cn/19da/2017-10/27/content_41805113_3.htm.

  29. "Xi Jinping'southward Keynote Accost at the APEC Business Leader's Summit " , Xinhua, 11 November 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1509676.shtml.

  30. Xi Jinping'south Crackdown on Private Tech Is Endangering Military Modernization, Richard A. Bitzinger, The Epoch Times, ten August 2021, https://www.theepochtimes.com/xi-jinpings-crackdown-on-private-tech-is-endangering-military-modernization_3942179.html?welcomeuser=1

  31. China offers a masterclass in how to humble large tech, right?,Schumpeter, the Economist, 24 July 2021

Which Of The Following Is Not A Common Method Of Privatizing Government Services,

Source: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/military-civil-fusion-strategy-of-china/

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